Sports leagues in different parts of the world are set up in different ways, some as open leagues and some as closed leagues. It has been shown that spending on players is higher in open leagues Ross 2000 and Valletti 2005) . This paper extends these studies, finding that sports leagues that practice promotion and relegation will have unambiguously higher aggregate spending on player talent than closed leagues. This will lower profits in the open league, but increase fan welfare.
Introduction
Most North American sports leagues are closed leagues that operate with a fixed set of teams every season. This differs from other leagues throughout the world that have open leagues that practice promotion, or a team from a lower division being promoted to a higher league, and relegation, where the lowest teams of a given division are demoted to a lower division. The difference in league structure means teams make choices concerning inter-season strategies, investment in players, and investment in revenue generating activities differently. League is divided into four hierarchical divisions. Below the Football League are several other 3 smaller leagues. For detailed descriptions of the English Football League and historical facts see Noll (2002) and Szymanski and Valletti (2005 Because closed league teams don't face free entry, there is less competition for television contracts and ticket prices. This allows teams to not only extract monopoly rents from these contracts, but they can also extract public subsidies for stadiums and facilities (Coates and Humphreys 2003 and Jasina and Rotthoff 2008) because of the scarcity of teams. The league, utilizing its monopoly powers, can also impose blackout rules on television coverage, which forces fans to purchase tickets to the event before the league broadcasts the event in local markets. This behavior is well documented in the literature (Noll and Zimbalist 1997 and Quirk and Fort 1992 and 1999 Szymanski and Ross (2000) consider a case with two large market teams and two small market teams and find that the difference between the strength of the two markets determines the total effort in the league. As the difference between the markets increases, total league effort increases, but they were unable to generalize any results for their model. Szymanski and Valletti (2005) take the Szymanski and Ross (2000) model a step further by solving and generalizing the model for the n-team case. Our paper continues the generalization of this model by allowing the contrast of a closed system and an open system. We solve for the equilibrium levels of spending on player talent as a function of league size and the number of teams being promoted and relegated.
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The next section will set up the models for both the open and closed leagues, followed by the analysis of these models. The last section will conclude.
2. Models
Open League
A two-period, two-division model is developed so that spending on talent in the first period is affected by the prospect of promotion and relegation. Assume that large market teams, teams 1 and 2, start in the top division and small market teams, teams 3 and 4, start in the lower division.
First period expected profit for large market teams can be written as
where t i is spending by team i on player talent, D μ1 is the expected profit of a large market team from retaining a place in the top division and D μ2 the expected profit following relegation to the lower division. The drawing power of large market teams is μ, which is assumed to be greater than one, and δ is the discount rate. First period expected profit for small market teams is
where D 1 is the expected profit of a small market team from promotion to the top division and D 2 is the expected profit from remaining in the bottom division. The drawing power of small market teams is λ, which is assumed to be less than one. Maximizing each of these functions with respect to spending, t, yields
These terms generalize for n teams in the top division and for n teams in the lower division
Assuming team 2 is relegated to the lower division and team 3 is promoted to the top division, second period expected profit for each team is
Maximizing equations 7 through 10 with respect to team spending on player talent, t, and solving for second period spending on player talent results in
Given these values we can solve for second period expected profit.
These values can be generalized for n-teams per division.
The subscripts 
Once the values of D μ1 , D μ , D 1 , D 2 , t 1 * and t 3 * are calculated, it is possible to calculate first period expected profit for large and small market teams.
For n-teams per division and k number of teams being promoted and relegated, first period expected profit is 
Closed League
Initially it is assumed that the closed league is made up of two large market teams. Expected profit for each period can be written as
The profit maximizing spending on player talent and expected profit each period will be In this model, entry will only occur if the existing teams can obtain a fee large enough to compensate them for their lost profit.
Since large market teams will not voluntarily expand the league, it is more conceivable that large and small market teams form competing leagues. Assuming teams 1 and 2 are large market teams and teams 3 and 4 are small market teams, teams face the same problem each period. Expected profit can be written as
The drawing power of large market teams is μ and is assumed to be greater than one. The drawing power of small market teams is λ and is less than one. The profit maximizing spending on player talent and expected profit each period is An important implication of our model is how a change in k, the number of teams promoted and relegated, will impact the spending of large market teams. Holding all else constant, as the number of teams being promoted or relegated (k) increases, the threat of relegation increases, giving teams the incentive to spend more on player talent. 3 Recall that relegation means playing in a lower division with lower revenue generating potential. To avoid relegation, teams will spend more on player talent. Increases in k have the opposite impact on team profit. As k increases, team profit decreases. Changing k has the opposite impact on the spending by teams in the bottom division. As k increases, the prospect of promotion increases, and teams have less of an incentive to spend on player talent. As spending decreases team profit increases. In general, top division teams spend more on player talent than large market teams in a closed league. The threat of relegation gives teams in the top division an additional incentive to invest in higher quality players than teams in closed leagues. Large market teams in a closed league do not have to worry about relegation when they make decisions on how much to spend on player talent.
Teams competing in the bottom division of an open league will spend more on player talent than small market teams in a closed league because of the prospect of promotion. Teams in the bottom division spend more for two reasons. The first is that teams seek promotion because the top division has higher revenue generating potential than the bottom division. The second reason teams seek promotion is that the prize or championship can only be won by teams in the top division. Promotion and relegation gives teams an added incentive to spend more on player 17 talent than teams in a closed league. This suggests that the overall quality of play will be higher in an open league than in a closed league resulting in more competitive games and higher fan utility. The model makes no clear predictions about competitive balance. Large market teams will tend to dominate the league because they generate more revenue to spend on quality players.
Although small market teams get promoted to the top division, their stay may be brief. These teams do not generate enough revenue to compete in the top division and are, therefore relegated soon thereafter. Even this brief stay in the top division may be beneficial to small market teams. Noll (2002) finds that on average, promotion into the Premier League is accompanied by an increase in attendance of 6,000 people per game. The benefits of promotion seem to last for a while after the team has been relegated to the lower division. This gives marginal teams the incentive to pursue a strategy of bouncing back and forth between the top division and the lower division.
4. Conclusion
This research extends the models found in Szymanski and Ross (2000) and Szymanski and Valletti (2005) and generates new results on aggregate spending. In particular, this paper finds that sports leagues that practice promotion and relegation will have unambiguously higher aggregate spending on player talent than closed leagues.
Promotion and relegation adds an additional dimension to league play that is not present in closed leagues. In order to avoid relegation, teams must play at the highest level all season long. Competition among top division teams to avoid relegation produces more spending on player talent than large market teams in a closed league. Teams in lower divisions will spend more on player talent than small market teams in a closed league since the prospect of promotion means higher expected profit. Higher spending on player talent at each hierarchical level means that the overall quality of play will be higher in an open league. If fans derive utility from the quality of on-field play, fans of open leagues will have higher utility than fans of closed leagues.
The issue of competitive balance is often used as an excuse for the restrictive practices in North American sports leagues. Teams in North America argue that in order to keep or promote competitive balance they must impose things like salary caps, luxury taxes and revenue sharing.
An extension of this framework to these issues would be a worthwhile undertaking.
